

VZCZCXRO5696  
PP RUEHBZ RUEH DU RUEHMR RUEHRN  
DE RUEHMB #0309/01 3160807  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 120807Z NOV 09  
FM AMEMBASSY MBABANE  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3777  
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MBABANE 000309

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2014

TAGS: [PREL](#) [WZ](#) [ZI](#) [SF](#) [SADC](#)

SUBJECT: SWAZI FOREIGN MINISTER SUGGESTS SOUTH AFRICAN  
INTERVENTION MAY LEAD TO MOVEMENT IN ZIMBABWE UNITY  
GOVERNMENT IMPASSE

Classified By: Ambassador Earl M. Irving  
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 11, Swaziland's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Lutfo E. Dlamini, told Ambassador that he recommended a summit on Zimbabwe to King Mswati III by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security. He and his troika counterparts judged that only at that level could Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai be persuaded to resume their agreement to work together. Dlamini described Mugabe as acting both bored and arrogant during the November 5 Maputo meeting on reconciliation. It was only when South African President Jacob Zuma spoke and gave Mugabe a deadline for action that the Zimbabwean president "sat up and paid attention." According to Dlamini, Zuma made it plain that both Mugabe and Tsvangirai had fifteen days to re-engage in the coalition government, or he would send a mediator to Harare to bring the parties together. The troika ruled out an immediate election in Zimbabwe, recommending rather that the Zimbabwean parties wait three or so years, or the alternative would be untrammelled violence. Dlamini ruled out the possibility of Mugabe running in the next election because he is physically frail, and recommended that Tsvangirai begin to market himself quietly to the SADC heads of state, to persuade them that he is not "a radical" in the pay of the Western community. Though vague about details, the Swazi foreign minister suggested that the SADC troika would like to consult the European Union and America on the Zimbabwe question. The Ambassador suggested that the SADC troika might think about ways to bring about an orderly transfer to a post-Mugabe era in Zimbabwe, including the possibility of some sort of amnesty process for security force heads. Dlamini took note of the idea, asserting that Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara both had rejected a Truth and Reconciliation Commission like that in South Africa. Although convinced of the utility of the SADC mechanism to influence events in Zimbabwe, he pooh-pooed Joseph Kabila as "the wrong man" to lead the troika, observing that "he can't run his own country." END SUMMARY.

2. (C) Swaziland's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Lutfo E. Dlamini, told Ambassador on November 11 that he recommended a summit on Zimbabwe to King Mswati III by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security. His recommendation was based on a visit to Zimbabwe in late October. He and his troika counterparts judged that only at that level could the two key participants in Zimbabwe's government of national unity, Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai, "who hate each other," be persuaded to resume their agreement to work together. Dlamini described Mugabe as acting both bored and arrogant upon arriving in Maputo on November 5, while the troika heads of state made their pleas for reconciliation. It was only when South African President Jacob Zuma, "who invited himself to the Summit," spoke that Mugabe "sat up and paid attention." According to Dlamini, Zuma made it plain that both Mugabe and Tsvangirai had fifteen days to re-engage in the coalition government, or he would send a mediator to Harare to bring the parties

together. Dlamini made a distinction between Thabo Mbeki, whom SADC hired to draw up a plan for Zimbabwe, and Zuma, who was elected partially on his promise to sort things out in Zimbabwe, but was not formally a part of the SADC mediation effort. Dlamini conceded that the South African president's vigorous intervention appeared to yield results.

13. (C) Dlamini said that in spite of the fact that the Zimbabwean national unity government did not enjoy legitimacy, it was what SADC had to work with. The troika ruled out an immediate election in Zimbabwe, recommending rather that the Zimbabwean parties wait three or so years before calling them, or the alternative would be untrammelled violence. He ruled out the possibility of Mugabe running in that election because he is frail and almost needs a walking stick to walk. Dlamini stated that employees of Tsvangirai's office and party earn "an average of USD 7,000 a month," more than ten times the amount paid to Zimbabwean government civil servants, because the West "tops them up." He recommended that Morgan Tsvangirai begin to market himself quietly to the SADC heads of state, to persuade them that he is not "a radical" in the pay of the Western community, which is their current perception. He thought Tsvangirai had more in common with them than Mugabe, whose rhetoric of colonialism had little resonance with the new generation of African leaders.

14. (C) Though vague about details, the Swazi foreign minister suggested that the SADC troika would like to consult the European Union and America on the Zimbabwe question. He attributed the violence in the country as being perpetrated by a "third force," possibly within the security forces.

MBABANE 00000309 002 OF 002

Dlamini seemed surprised to hear from Ambassador that it was our impression that the violence was meticulously planned and executed by ZANU-PF with government security force facilitation, if not participation. We further indicated our belief that it had not been beneath the ZANU-PF government's dignity to use food as a weapon in the past. The Ambassador suggested that the SADC troika might think about ways to bring about an orderly transfer to a post-Mugabe era in Zimbabwe, including the possibility of some sort of amnesty process for security force heads. Dlamini took note of the idea, asserting that Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara both had rejected a Truth and Reconciliation Commission like that in South Africa.

15. (C) COMMENT: Dlamini is an active minister who is constantly on the road, leaving his ministry demoralized and not well briefed about his work. Whether his frequent trips abroad have resulted in tangible benefits for the Kingdom is unclear, though they have succeeded in keeping his profile high within the government and in the press. His account of his work on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security illustrates some of the perceptions and misconceptions with which he and, one might extrapolate, his colleagues in the troika operate. Although convinced of the utility of the SADC mechanism to influence events in Zimbabwe, he pooh-poohed Joseph Kabila as "the wrong man" to lead the troika, observing that "he can't run his own country." To illustrate his point, Dlamini reported that when in Kinshasa for a summit, King Mswati was lodged in a five-star hotel that had no water. "The king had to wash his hands in a bucket," he said in disgust.

IRVING